e Defaultness Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2015c) maintains that it is Defaultness that reigns supreme, superseding all factors known to a ect processing initially, such as degree of Non/literalness, Non/salience, Context strength, or Affirmation. Here we focus on weighing degree of Defaultness against degree of Affirmation. We show that, as predicted, processing default, salient responses to familiar Negatives is faster than processing nondefault, low-salience responses to less-familiar A rmative counterparts. We further show that, despite bene tting from equally strong contextual support, default nonsalient Negative Sarcasm is processed faster than nondefault nonsalient A rmative Sarcasm. 1 Using linguistic and pictorial contexts, we also demonstrate that it is Defaultness that accounts for Nondefaultness' appeal, rendering it optimally innovative and hence pleasing. It is Defaultness, then, that singlehandedly a ects both processing speed as well as likability.
that it is Defaultness rather than degree of A rmation that matters. Finally, we test the prediction that when nondefaultness involves retainable Defaultness, which it de-automatizes, such default interpretation will render Nondefaultness pleasing. Defaultness, then, is expected to shape our understanding and pleasurability.
. e Defaultness Hypothesis
e Defaultness Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2015c) posits the supremacy of Defaultness, which shapes processing, while further a ecting pleasure. Being a general theory, the Defaultness Hypothesis encompasses both the Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 1997 (Giora, , 2003 (Giora, , 2006 and the View of Default Nonliteral interpretations (Giora et al., , 2015a Giora, Drucker, & Fein, 2014) , while reconciling their inconsistencies. It further prompts the revisitation of the Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2004; Giora, Fein, Kotler, & Shuval, 2015b) , extending it beyond default meanings to further allow the inclusion of default interpretations (as proposed by Giora, Givoni, Heruti, & Fein, 2017) .
Defaultness is de ned in terms of an unconditional, automatic response to a stimulus. e Defaultness of lexicalized, salient meanings was predicted and established by the Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 1997 (Giora, , 2003 . However, the Defaultness of nonsalient, noncoded, constructed interpretations -an option deemed unfathomable by the Graded Salience Hypothesis -is not just predicted by the Defaultness Hypothesis but has also been established experimentally (see Filik et al., in progress; Giora et al., 2015c) . Here, therefore, the predictions of the Defaultness Hypothesis are tested with regard to both meanings and interpretations. ey are weighed against those following from the view of A rmation as a signi cant facilitative factor. e overall aim is to testify to the superiority of Defaultness over A rmation.
As mentioned above, the studies reported below test the superiority of Defaultness with regard to meanings (Section 2.1) and interpretations (Section 2.2). e focus here is on nonliteral (idiomatic and sarcastic) negatives and a rmatives and their respective counterparts. In Section (2.1), processing of default salient nonliteral meanings of familiar negative idioms ( e apple doesn't fall far from the tree) is compared to processing nondefault nonsalient interpretations of nonliteral less-familiar a rmative counterparts ( e apple falls far from the tree). Similarly, processing of default salient nonliteral meanings of familiar a rmative idioms ( e grass is always greener on the other side of the fence) is compared to processing nondefault nonsalient interpretations of less-familiar nonliteral negative counterparts ( e grass is not always greener on the other side of the fence). In Section (2.2), default, nonsalient interpretations of Negative Sarcasm (He is not the most restrained person possible) are weighed against nondefault, nonsalient interpretations of A rmative Sarcasm (He is the most restrained person possible). Section (2.3) tests the possibility that the costs of Nondefaultness, incurred by the initial involvement of Defaultness in the process, might be o set by hedonic e ects, regardless of type of context (e.g., linguistic vs. pictorial).
. On the superiority of default meanings
Construing the Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 1997 (Giora, , 1999 (Giora, , 2003 in terms of the Defaultness Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2015c) allows us to rephrase the di erences inherent to graded Salience in terms of degrees of Defaultness. Indeed, the Graded Salience Hypothesis distinguishes between default and nondefault meanings (Giora, 1997 (Giora, , 1999 (Giora, , 2003 and default and nondefault interpretations (Fein, Yeari, & Giora, 2015; Giora, Fein, Laadan, Wolfson, Zeituny, Kidron, Kaufman, & Shaham, 2007) . 2 Default meanings are salient meanings -meanings listed in the mental lexicon, ranking high on prominence due to cognitive factors (such as prototypicality, stereotypicality, individual relevance, etc.) and/or degree of exposure (e.g., experiential familiarity, conventionality, or frequency of a stimulus). A case in point is the ' nancial institution' meaning of bank. In contrast, meanings listed in the mental lexicon ranking low on prominence due to being less frequent, less conventionalized, less prototypical, etc., are less-salient. A case in point is the 'riverside' meaning of bank. Finally, meanings not listed in the mental lexicon are nonsalient. A case in point might be 'the killer of god' meaning of deicide. In sum, whereas a salient meaning is a default response, less-salient and nonsalient meanings are nondefault responses.
According to the Graded Salience Hypothesis, coded, salient meanings of e.g., words or collocations will be prompted automatically upon encountering the relevant stimulus, regardless of all other factors known to a ect processing. Lesssalient and nonsalient meanings will lag behind, and will o en rely on explicit cuing (Givoni, Giora, & Bergerbest, 2013) or contextual information for their activation. Indeed, as predicted, salient meanings have been shown to be prompted automatically, faster than less or nonsalient counterparts (Giora, 2003) .
e Graded Salience Hypothesis further distinguishes between default and nondefault interpretations. Default interpretations are responses constructed compositionally (e.g., 'He is very intelligent'), based on the coded, salient meanings of the stimulus components (He is the smartest person around). Being salience-based, . Although assumed as default, within the framework of the Graded Salience Hypothesis, such meanings and interpretations were not yet termed "default". such interpretations are activated unconditionally, regardless of degree of nonliteralness or contextual support. In contrast, nondefault interpretations (e.g., 'He is stupid' of He is the smartest person around) are nonsalient responses, based primarily on contextual information (indicating that the person in question is an idiot).
Salience-based interpretations will be processed faster than nonsalient counterparts. Indeed, as predicted, salience-based interpretations (e.g., the contextually incompatible literal interpretations of sarcastic utterances) have been shown to be prompted automatically, faster than nonsalient sarcastic counterparts, irrespective of contextual bias (Fein et al., 2015; Filik, Leuthold, Wallington, & Page, 2014; Giora, 2003; Giora et al., 2007 ; but see Gibbs, 1994 for a di erent context-based view).
..
Predictions Default (salient) meanings of any linguistic stimulus, whether a word or a collocation ( e apple doesn't fall far from the tree; e grass is always greener on the other side of the fence), will be accessed automatically, faster than nondefault, noncoded counterparts, regardless of degree of A rmation ( e apple falls far from the tree; e grass is not always greener on the other side of the fence).
.. Processing default meanings
To test the prediction that Defaultness rather than A rmation prevails, Meytes and Tamir, (2005) examined the processing speed of default negative and a rmative idiomatic meanings and their nondefault a rmative and negative idiomatic interpretations. Participants were 40 volunteers, students of the Academic College of Tel-AvivYa o, all native speakers of Hebrew.
Materials consisted of 80 (Hebrew) idioms and proverbs, divided between 40 afrmative and 40 negative idioms. e a rmative items included 20 highly frequent a rmatives ( e grass is always greener on the other side of the fence), conveying a default gurative meaning ('other people's lives always seem better than your/our own'), and 20 signi cantly less frequent a rmatives ( e apple falls far from the tree), conveying a nondefault gurative interpretation ('the o spring doesn't take a er his parents'); the latter involves the default idiomatic meaning in the process, while rejecting it (see Examples (2) and (4) below, bold added for convenience).
e negative items included 20 highly frequent negatives ( e apple doesn't fall far from the tree), conveying a default gurative meaning ('the o spring takes a er his parents'), and 20 signi cantly less frequent negative counterparts ( e grass is not always greener on the other side of the fence), conveying a nondefault gurative interpretation ('other people's lives are not always better than your/our own'), the latter involves the default, idiomatic meaning in the process, while rejecting it (see Examples (1) and (3) below, bold added for convenience). Items' degree of frequency was established on the basis of a corpus search (in Hebrew). All materials were embedded in identical neutral contexts, which, were occasionally followed by a "yes" or a "no" comprehension question:
Items conveying Defaultness
Negative:
(1) Dani: Have you seen how Nachum's son behaves? Yoel: Yes, the apple doesn't fall far from the tree. Dani: He has such a nerve this little one! A rmative: (2) Ruthi: My sister-in-law's kids seem so obedient and sweet, a real bliss. Shira: e grass is always greener on the other side of the fence. Ruthi: Still, it o en seems to me that I am too lenient with my two naughty ones.
Items conveying Nondefaultness
Negative: (3) Ruthi: My sister-in-law's kids seem so obedient and sweet, a real bliss. Shira: e grass is not always greener on the other side of the fence. Ruthi: Still, it o en seems to me that I am too lenient with my two naughty ones.
A rmative: (4) Dani: Have you seen how Nachum's son behaves? Yoel: Yes, the apple falls far from the tree. Dani: He has such a nerve this little one! Using a moving windows technique, participants self-paced their reading of the items, which were displayed on a computer screen one sentence at a time, and answered the "yes" or "no" comprehension questions that followed. Reading times of the target sentences were recorded by the so ware.
Results and discussion
Mean reading times (RTs) and standard deviations (SDs) are presented in Table 1 and illustrated by Figure 1 . ey were subjected to two two-way ANOVAs, for both participant (F 1 ) and item (F 2 ) analyses, with Defaultness (Default/Nondefault) and degree of A rmation (A rmative/Negative) as independent variables, and reading times of targets as a dependent variable. Result showed no signi cant e ect of degree of A rmation (F 1 (1, 39) = 1.30, p = .26, n.s.; F 2 (1, 76) = 0.14 ,p = .71, n.s), but a signi cant e ect of Defaultness (F 1 (1, 39) = 99.76, p < .001.; F 2 (1, 76) = 16.50 ,p < .001). As predicted, default targets were processed signi cantly faster than nondefault counterparts (2.06 sec compared to 2.58 sec). Processing linguistic stimuli, then, is insensitive to degree of A rmation. Instead, it is sensitive to degree of Defaultness. Default negative meanings are processed faster than nondefault a rmative interpretations; similarly, default a rmative meanings are processed faster than nondefault negative interpretations. A rmation, then, pales in the presence of Defaultness. It is Defaultness rather than A rmation that shines. e superiority of Defaultness over A rmation notwithstanding, it could still be argued that the phenomena addressed here do not really speak to the issue of degree of Defaultness, since what is compared here are two di erent response levelslexicalized meanings (e.g., e apple doesn't fall far from the tree) and constructed interpretations (e.g., e apple falls far from the tree). Will comparing default and nondefault constructed interpretations allow us to replicate the ndings attesting to the superiority of Defaultness over A rmation?
. On the superiority of default interpretations
Recall that the Graded Salience Hypothesis distinguishes between default lexicalized and prominent meanings (termed salient) and nondefault meanings, which are either not lexicalized (termed nonsalient) or lexicalized but not prominent (termed less-salient). It further distinguishes between default (lexicon-based) compositional interpretations (termed salience-based) and nondefault (primarily context-based) interpretations (termed nonsalient). ese distinctions, however, are limited, as they would not allow to account for default, nonsalient interpretations of novel stimuli such as He is not the most restrained person possible, or Do you really believe he is the most restrained person possible? interpreted sarcastically by default, as established by Giora et al., (2015c) and Giora, Ja e, & Fein (submitted) respectively; for similar default, albeit nonsalient, interpretations, see also Giora et al. (2013 Giora et al. ( , 2015b . In contrast, the Defaultness Hypothesis, which de nes as default an (establishable) unconditional response to a stimulus, can account for the Defaultness of nonsalient interpretations as well, which can be faster to process than nondefault yet salience-based counterparts (as shown by Giora et al., 2013 Giora et al., , 2015b .
.. Predictions
Recall that the Defaultness Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2015c) predicts the superiority of default interpretations over nondefault counterparts, irrespective of factors known to a ect processing, such as degree of A rmation, Nonliteralness, Novelty, and Contextual support. Here, however, we focus on the prediction that Defaultness rather than A rmation will prevail. Speci cally, i. default interpretations will be prompted instantly, initially and directly, faster than nondefault counterparts, irrespective of degree of A rmation/Negation (Section 2.2.2 below). ii. Invoked unconditionally, default interpretations will be further involved in retrieving nondefault counterparts, slowing those down in the process. iii. Still, when Defaultness' interference with Nondefaultness renders it quali able for (revised) Optimal Innovation (Giora et al., 2017) , such nondefault interpretations will be pleasing, more pleasing than both default and nondefault counterparts, not quali able for Optimal Innovation (Giora et al., 2017 ; see Section 2.3 below).
.. Processing default interpretations
is section focuses on the prediction that Defaultness rather than A rmation will reign (see Section 2.2.1 prediction (i) above). In particular, default interpretations, whether negative or a rmative, will be processed faster than nondefault counterparts, whether a rmative or negative. To test this prediction, Giora et al. (2015c) rst established degree of Defaultness. In Experiment 1, Hebrew a rmative and negative counterparts (He is/is not the most restrained person possible), controlled for novelty, were presented in isolation, followed by a 7 -point scale, pseudorandomly instantiating a literal and a sarcastic interpretation at its ends. Native speakers of Hebrew, students of Tel Aviv University, were asked to rate the proximity of the stimuli's interpretation to those presented at the scale's ends. Results indicated that the favored interpretation of the negative items was sarcastic; the favored interpretation of the a rmative counterparts was literal. In addition, explicitly probing these items for degree of saracsm further guaranteed that the interpretations of the negatives were consciously perceived as sarcastic; those of the a rmatives, however, were taken at face value.
Giora et al.'s (2015c) Experiment 1, then, singled out 2 default (Negative Sarcasm and A rmative Literalness) and 2 nondefault (A rmative Saracsm and Negative Literalness) interpretations. Establishing degree of Defaultness of both negative and a rmative counterparts allowed us to weigh comparable phenomena (i.e., interpretations) against each other. In Giora et al. 's Experiment 2, these items were embedded in contexts, controlled for equal strength of support of their respective default and nondefault interpretations (all scoring signi cantly higher than 6 on a 7-point scale, all t's > 5, all p's < .005), thereby preempting a potential confound of contextual strength (see Examples (5)- (8) below, bold and italics added, for convenience).
(5) Default negative sarcasm
During the welcoming toast for the new manager, the workers at Shahar Company were waiting patiently for the speech to end. Everyone was already hungry but they knew it would only last a few minutes longer. Only Eitan got up and began to grab food from the table. He stacked his plate and began gorging himself. Ronit whispered to Hadas: "What an impolite and impatient person. I'm shocked. Can't he hold on for another minute?" Hadas (grimaced): "Yes, he's always like this. He is not the most restrained person possible. I think he's extremely rude. "
(6) Nondefault Affirmative Sarcasm During the welcoming toast for the new manager, the workers at Shahar Company were waiting patiently for the speech to end. Everyone was already hungry but they knew it would only last a few minutes longer. Only Eitan got up and began to grab food from the table. He stacked his plate and began gorging himself. Ronit whispered to Hadas: "What an impolite and impatient person. I'm shocked. Can't he hold on for another minute?" Hadas: "I thought he was a polite guy." Ronit: "Yeah right. He is the most restrained person possible. I think he's extremely rude. "
(7) Default Affirmative Literalness During the welcoming toast for the new manager, the workers at Shahar Company were waiting impatiently for the speech to end. Everyone was already hungry and at a certain point they started piling their plates. Only Eitan sat quietly and waited. "Look, he's so polite", Ronit said to her friend, Hadas. "Yes, it's very impressive! In the sta meeting we've just had, Shlomo was rude to him, but he didn't respond and kept his cool. He's really cool and a very considerate guy, and overall, he is the most restrained person possible. I think he's a role model of restraint. "
(8) Nondefault Negative Literalness During the welcoming toast for the new manager, the workers at Shahar Company were waiting impatiently for the speech to end. Everyone was already hungry and at a certain point they started piling their plates. Only Eitan sat quietly and waited. "Look, he's so polite" said Ronit to her friend, Hadas, "he's so great at self-control. " Hadas: " at's right. He almost always keeps his cool and calm. e only ones in the company who are more composed than he is are Adam and Maor. ey're really the only ones in a company of 500. So, only compared to these two, we might say that he is not the most restrained person possible. I think he's a role model of restraint. " e applied measures were processing speed of the target utterances and the spillover segments that followed.
Recall that according to the Defaultness Hypothesis, default interpretations of targets, such as Negative Sarcasm (5) (He is not the most restrained person possible) and Affirmative Literalness (7) (He is the most restrained person possible) should be processed faster than their nondefault counterparts, i.e., Affirmative Sarcasm (6) and Negative Literalness (8), the latter involving inappropriate default (sarcastic) interpretations in the process. Note, further, that only in the case of nondefault, Negative Literalness, these default interpretations are disruptive and will have to be discarded; in the case of nondefault Affirmative Sarcasm, however, they will be retained and contribute to the interpretation process. Consider, further, that, on account of its Defaultness, A rmative Literalness is expected to be processed faster than nondefault Negative Literalness; default Negative Sarcasm, however, is expected to be processed faster than nondefault A rmative Sarcasm.
As illustrated by Figures 2-3 , results support the Defaultness Hypothesis. ey attest to the superiority of Defaultness over Nondefaultness, irrespective of all other factors known to a ect processing such as contextual support, degree of nonsalience, degree of nonliteralness, and degree of a rmation, the latter being the key issue at stake here. Indeed, the ndings attest to the signi cantly speedier processing of default Negative Sarcasm and its spillover segment (5) over nondefault A rmative Sarcasm and its spillover segment (6) Defaultness, then, shines; affirmation, however, pales. Still, may the costs of Nondefaultness, incurred by the interference of Defaultness, be somewhat compensated for? . Non/defaultness and pleasurability In Section (2.2.2), we have shown that, as predicted, Defaultness is processed faster than Nondefaultness, irrespective of degree of A rmation (as well as other factors known to affect processing). Indeed, interpreting Defaultness (e.g., Negative Sarcasm) is a direct and speedy process; interpreting Nondefaultness (e.g., A rmative Sarcasm) is indirect and slow, involving the unconditional default (e.g., literal) interpretation initially, thus obstructing the processing course (see also Fein et al., 2015; Giora et al., 2007) . Still, the involvement of Defaultness in processing Nondefaultness might allow Nondefaultness to qualify for revised Optimal Innovation and consequently be gratifying (Giora et al., 2017) . According to the revised Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2017) , then, the processing costs of Nondefaultness may be compensated for by rewarding e ects.
Speci cally, according to the Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora et al. 2004 (Giora et al. , 2015 and its revised version (Giora et al. 2017) , pleasurability is sensitive to Optimal Innovation. A stimulus would be optimally innovative if a. it involves a nondefault response, which di ers from the default response associated with it both quantitatively and qualitatively, while b. allowing for the automatic recoverability of that default response, which it de-automatizes, so that both responses are comparable and entertainable (e.g., their similarities and di erences assessable).
Note that according to the original Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2004) , a novel stimulus (Know hope) conveying a nondefault response (related to optimism) would qualify for optimal innovation if it de-automatized a default, coded and salient meaning of a familiar stimulus (No hope; related to pessimism). Default conventionalized sarcastic meanings, such as the familiar Big deal, may also be de-automatized and rendered optimally innovative by a nondefault literal counterpart, such as BigDeal -the name of an e-shop. 3 ese default meanings spring to mind automatically. However, once they are entertained and de-familiarized, they allow for both responses, the familiar and the novel, to interact and carve an optimally innovative interpretation. In contrast, the revised version of the Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2017) allows optimal innovations to involve de-automatization of both, default coded meanings as well as default constructed interpretations. Here, the relevant candidate for a revised optimal innovation is the interpretation of A rmative Sarcasm. Given that Negative Sarcasm is a default response, involving no other responses while being construed, it cannot be considered a candidate for optimal . http://www.bigdeal.co.il/AllCamp.aspx innovation (as can't A rmative Literalness, which is also a default interpretation, and Negative literalness, which suppresses its automatic default interpretation; see also Giora et al., 2017) . However, nondefault A rmative Sarcasm, activating a default (e.g., literal) interpretation when constructed, which, however, is instrumental in deriving the sarcastic interpretation, is quali able for optimal innovation.
..
Predictions According to the Defaultness Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2015c) and the revised Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2017) which follows it, Affirmative Sarcasm (6), de-automatizing a default interpretation (i.e., A rmative Literalness), will be rated as more pleasing than Negative Sarcasm (5), which is activated directly (see also prediction (iii) Section 2.2.1 above). is should be also true of such items when preceded by pictorially biasing contexts.
.. Hedonic e ects
In Giora et al. (2017, Example (1)), participants were presented items, tested for processing speed in Giora et al. (2015c, Example (2)), all controlled for novelty and equal strength of contextual support. Pleasurability scores, ranging on a 7-point scale, were collected from 40 native speakers of Hebrew. Results are illustrated by Figure 4 . ey indicate that, as predicted, nondefault Affirmative Sarcasm, the only candidate here quali able for Optimal Innovation, was pleasing (4.07) -signicantly more pleasing than default Negative Sarcasm (3.48), t 1 (39) = 2.53, p < .01; t 2 (11) = 3.91, p < .005 (and the rest of the options not quali able for Optimal Innovation, namely, default Affirmative Literalness and nondefault Negative Literalness, which did not di er from each other pleasurability-wise).
As predicted, Defaultness, being unconditionally swi , rendered Nondefaultness slow, which, in turn, allowed for Nondefaultness to induce pleasure. Will these results be replicated in the presence of pictorial contexts, as predicted by the Defaultness Hypothesis and the revised Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (see Section 2.3.1)?
In Giora et al. (2017, Example (2)), we put this question to the test. Here, participants were presented one pair of Negative and A rmative targets, used in Giora et al., (2017, Example (1)), biased toward their sarcastic interpretation by the same pictorial context (see Figure 5 below). Equal strength of contextual bias was controlled by a pretest. Results show that negative targets scored as high on sarcasm (M = 5.49, SD = 0.94) as did their a rmative counterparts (M = 5.70, SD = 0.88), t 1 (39) = 1.48, p = .15 (two-tail), t 2 (11) = 1.49, p = .16 (two-tail), scoring signi cantly higher than5 on the 7-point contextual strength scale (all t's > 3, all p's < .005). As before, pleasurability scores, ranging on a 7-point scale, were collected from 30 volunteers, students of Tel Aviv University, all native speakers of Hebrew. Results are illustrated by Figure 6 . ey show that, as predicted, nondefault Affirmative Sarcasm, the only candidate here quali able for Optimal Innovation, was pleasing (4.25; SD = 1.41) -signi cantly more pleasing than default Negative Sarcasm (3.65; SD = 1.30), t 1 (29) = 3.23, p < .005; t 2 (11) = 3.95, p < .005.
Defaultness, then, reigns. Being automatic and speedy, it interferes with deriving Nondefaultness. However, when relevant to the nondefault interpretation, it is retained and contributes to a ecting pleasure. 
. Conclusions
According to the Defaultness Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2015c) default, unconditional responses, whether a rmative or negative, literal or nonliteral, salient, salience-based, or nonsalient, will prevail, regardless of the presence of a strong context, supportive of a nondefault alternative. To test this prediction, we focused here on the speci c prediction that Defaultness rather than A rmation (assumed to facilitate processing) will a ect processing costs and pleasing e ects signi cantly. Results from a number of studies showed that, as predicted, i. default salient meanings of familiar nonliteral negative stimuli ( e apple doesn't fall far from the tree) were processed faster than nondefault nonsalient interpretations of nonliteral a rmative counterparts, lower on familiarity ( e apple falls far from the tree), while both were embedded in equally neutral contexts (see Section 2.1); ii. default nonsalient nonliteral interpretations of unfamiliar negative stimuli (He is not the most restrained person possible) were processed faster than nondefault nonsalient nonliteral interpretations of similarly unfamiliar a rmative counterparts (He is the most restrained person possible), both embedded in equally strong contexts biased toward their sarcastic interpretation (see Section 2.2);
iii. Invoked unconditionally, default literal interpretations of novel a rmative stimuli (He is the most restrained person possible) were involved in retrieving nondefault A rmative Sarcasm, slowing it down, while further rending it quali able for (revised) Optimal Innovation (see Section 2.3). iv. As a result, such nondefault interpretations of a rmative stimuli were pleasing, more pleasing than both default and nondefault counterparts, not quali able for Optimal Innovation (see Section 2.3). Relevant to our discussion here is the nding that nondefault A rmative Sarcasm was more pleasing than default Negative Sarcasm, although both were equally novel and equally strongly supported by contextual information, whether linguistic or pictorial.
It is only Defaultness that reigns, superseding degree of A rmation, degree of Nonliteralness, degree of Nonsalience, or degree of Context strength. No contemporary theory can account for all these ndings taken together. Negation theories, for one (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1977; Horn, 1989; Givón, 1993 Givón, , 2002 Wason, 1959 Wason, , 1961 , cannot explain the processing superiority of negative idioms and Negative Sarcasm over a rmative counterparts; given the superiority of default idioms and default Negative Sarcasm, Literalness-based accounts (e.g., Grice, 1975) cannot account for these di erences either; neither can Contextualists (e.g., Gibbs, 1994) explain these di erences, given that contexts are equally strongly biased in favor of both a rmative and negative counterparts; echoic mention accounts too (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1986 cannot explain the superiority of Negative Sarcasm over A rmative Sarcasm, given that only the latter is echoic; a er all, Negative Sarcasm does not echo a negative alternative. Nor can pretense theories explain these ndings, given that Negative Sarcasm does not involve pretense, or allusional-pretense, whereas a rmative sarcasm does (e.g., Barnden, this volume; Clark & Gerrig, 1984; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, & Brown, 1995) . And will a uni ed theory of irony, such as proposed by e.g., Colston (this volume), Gibbs & Samermit (this volume) , and Willison (this volume) be able to accommodate this new concept of default, non-echoic Negative Sarcasm, given that irony research has exclusively dealt with nondefault a rmative ironies (termed here A rmative Sarcasm)?
So far, the Defaultness Hypothesis is the only theory that can account for all the results taken together. It is only Defaultness that shines.
